Abstract. This paper examines the determinants of multiple job holding in the United Kingdom. We address these issues using data from the first eleven waves of the British Household Panel Survey, which covered the period from 1991 to 2001.
Introduction
Evidence from the eleventh wave of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) indicates that in 2001 approximately 10.5% of British workers held second jobs, while 56.6% of British people held main jobs ( Table 1 ). Given that there were 27.5 million workers in the UK in 2001 (ONS 2003) , it is estimated that approximately 2.888 million workers were engaged in multiple job holding in the UK in 2001. This far exceeds official figure of 1.158 million workers with second jobs (ONS, 2003) , which is based on the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). The large disparity between is mostly likely driven by the differences in the reference period across the two datasets: whereas the BHPS asks people about their second jobs in the last calendar month, the second jobs in the QLFS refer to jobs in the reference week (week ending last Sunday).
However, limited attention has been focused on examining the determinants of multiple job holding, for instance, UK research over the last 20 years is confined to the studies of Bell et al. (1997) , Boheim and Taylor (2003) and Heineck and Schwarze (2004) . Similarly, there is a paucity of contemporary research work on multiple job holding in other countries, most notably the United States (Shishko and Rostker, 1976; Hunt et al., 1985; Paxson and Sicherman, 1996; Averett, 2001; Partridge, 2002) , Canada (Weersink et al., 1998) , Poland (Bedi, 1998) , Sweden (Lundborg, 1995) , Italy (Masi, 1987) , Yugoslavia (Reilly and Krstic, 2003) , Russia (Foley, 1997) and France (Menger, 1999) .
Hence, given both the contradiction between reality and official statistics, together with relatively little academic attention, this study seeks to shed light on the issue of who moonlights and why do some people choose to do so.
To answer this question there are four main hypotheses. Firstly, the main job hours constrained model is where an individual's willingness to take a second job depends on whether they can work enough hours at their prevailing primary wage rate to satisfy their income goals (Shishko and Rostker, 1976) . Therefore, individuals take a second job in addition to their main job because their employers do not, for various reasons, offer enough hours on the main job. In relation to this, Friesen (2001) shows that the constraints created by overtime pay regulation appear to induce a considerable number of workers to take up a second job. Thus, hours constraint models assume that F o r P e e r R e v i e w 3 the main job wage exceeds the second job wage, creating a convex kink in the budget constraint due to the hours constraint on the main job (Foley, 1997) .
Secondly, the heterogeneous jobs model hypothesis suggests that labour supplied to different jobs may not be perfect substitutes or, put differently, the wage paid and utility lost from the foregone leisure may not completely reflect the benefits and costs of working (Conway and Kimmel, 1998) . Therefore, the incentive for moonlighting is that having two jobs enables individuals to engage in activities of particular interest to them.
Thirdly, the main job insecurity model hypothesis is where an individual may hold a second job if they believe that their main job has a high risk of termination. Thus a second job may cushion the financial impact of losing their main source of earnings, especially if there is scope for increasing the number of hours worked in the second job. Therefore, multiple job holding may be a response to perceived job insecurity and may be a "hedge against unemployment" (Bell et al., 1997) . Alternatively, multiple job holding may be used as a way of smoothing uncertain incomes 1 .
Finally, workers in jobs associated with non-pecuniary benefits are more prone to moonlighting whereby if earnings fall for such jobs, it is rational to have two jobs (Lundborg, 1995) . In contrast, for jobs with no non-pecuniary benefits a fall in earnings causes a rational worker to leave that employment altogether. Consequently, we have the so-called target income model, in which the individual determines their allocation of work on different jobs to reach a certain income level. holding. We address these issues using data from the initial eleven waves (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) of the BHPS, with empirical work carried out separately for both men and women.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two presents stylised facts about moonlighting in the UK. Section three develops a theoretical model to guide the empirical work. Section four discusses the data and the empirical results.
Section five offers a brief conclusion. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Paxson and Sicherman, 1996) . Consequently, these facts would appear to lend more credibility to the existence of the heterogeneous jobs hypothesis in the UK.
The theoretical model
The theoretical framework for identifying the determinants of multiple job holding is well known (Shishko and Rostker, 1976; Krishnan, 1990; Ballou, 1995; Bell et al., 1997; Foley, 1997; Conway and Kimmel, 1998) .
Consider a representative individual with a well-behaved utility function
where C is a composite consumption good and L is leisure. Suppose each person holds a main job and supplies 1 h hours of work at wage rate 1 w , which the main job holder is powerless to affect. The number of hours worked at a second job 2 h depends on the wage rate 2 w , which the second job holder is also powerless to affect.
The worker faces a budget constraint restricting the level of consumption of C to the sum of all labour and non-labour income.
The utility function written in Eq. (1) is maximized subject to both a budget and a time constraint, or
and
Where Y is non-wage income and T is the total amount of time available. Substituting Eqs. (2) and (3) into (1) gives the utility maximisation problem that the individual faces:
Where 1 h and 2 h are two choice variables. The first order condition gives us the two necessary conditions: 
On the conditions of both a budget and a time constraint from Eq. (2) 
Data and empirical results
The sample used in this paper includes all adults in the first eleven waves of the BHPS covering the period from 1991 to 2001. The BHPS is suitable for studying multiple job holding since, in each wave, five questions relating to an individual's second job were asked:
1. Do you currently earn any money from a second job or from work that you might do from time to time apart from your main job?
2. What is it that you do and what does the firm or person you work for make or do?
3. Are you an employee or self-employed?
4. How many hours do you usually work a month in your second job, excluding meal breaks but including any overtime you might do?
5. Before tax and other deductions how much did you earn from your second and all other occasional jobs in the last calendar month?
More questions relating to an individual's main job were asked in the BHPS, inter alia: 6. What type of organisation do you work for in your main job?
7. Thinking about your main job, how many hours, excluding overtime and meal breaks, are you expected to work in a normal week?
8. Is your job a permanent job or not?
9. Are you a member of a trade union/association?
Additionally, many questions regarding personal or family characteristics of the individuals are also contained in the BHPS relating to education, location, number of children, marriage, health, age and time spent travelling to work for the main job.
These provide us with a suitable data set for assessing UK multiple job holding. Table 2 defines the dependent and independent variables, whilst summary statistics of the sample are detailed in Table 3 for men and women. The first column describes the sample of moonlighters, the second column describes the sample of main job holders and the third column describes the full sample.
Averett (2001) A further consideration is that second jobs, on average, yield a much higher wage rate than main jobs (Foley, 1997) . This begs the question why do workers who earn a higher wage in their second job not take it as their main job. One possible explanation is that so many of the second-jobs are in self-employment 2 . Moreover, an exclusive focus on the mean wage ratio might be misleading if the distribution is highly skewed.
In the US, the mean ratio of second job wage to main job wage is 1.839 for men and 1.715 for women with the median wage ratios being 1.05 and 1.00 respectively (Paxson and Sicherman 1996) . Our own calculation based on the BHPS reveals that for the UK the mean ratio of second job wage to main job wage is 2.02 for men and 1.52 for women whilst the median ratios were 0.81 and 0.76 respectively. Hence, on average, the second job wage is much higher than the main job wage. However, if we exclude the wages of the top 5% of moonlighting earners, the mean second job wage is lower than the mean main job wage indicating that the main body of moonlighters are poorer rather than richer. In the case of an hours constrained moonlighter, the wage rate on the main job will be higher than the wage rate on the second job.
However, in the case of an individual moonlighter for any reason other than hours constraint, the wage rate on the second job will not necessarily be lower than the wage rate on the main job (Averett 2001) . Indeed, the BHPS indicates that over 70% of male and some 65% of female moonlighters earn more on their second jobs than their main jobs, suggesting a lack of support for the first hypothesis, namely that British moonlighters are motivated by having their main job hours constrained.
In relation to the second group of explanatory variables, the job satisfaction variables are derived from the BHPS with workers reporting in scales 5, 6 and 7 grouped as satisfied, while others are grouped as non-satisfied. However, it is important to note the presence of a participation effect whereby for cultural reasons, women who are dissatisfied at work may find it easier to leave the labour force than their male equivalents. Thus, satisfied women workers may be a statistical construct, as more of the women who would be dissatisfied at work are not working (Clark, 1996) . Additionally, Booth et al. (2002) find that, in general terms that seasonalcasual men and women are significantly less likely to be satisfied with their jobs than permanent workers. However, no difference in overall job satisfaction emerges between workers in permanent jobs and those on fixed-term contracts. When Booth et al. (2002) find that temporary workers are less satisfied than permanent workers, who have promotion prospects and job security. Hence, the image of the worker with a second job is not that of someone who is necessarily satisfied with the world of work, consequently, they potentially possess an exaggerated tendency to report lower levels of job satisfaction, but this is less significant than their dissatisfaction with pay (Clark 1996) .
We estimate the moonlighting labour supply equation via a Tobit Model separately for men and women using the maximum likelihood estimation (Greene, 2000) . Tables 4 and 5 In terms of what affects moonlighters' decisions to devote time and effort to their second jobs? Tables 4 and 5 indicate that income is a consistently significant criterion.
The decision to moonlight involves a trade-off between income and leisure, whereby higher second job wages (J2WAGE) increase the labour supply of second jobs both for men and women, so that the substitution effect dominates the income effect. The labour supply curve of second jobs, however, has not reached the point of backward bending, although the average second job wage is much higher than the average main job wage (see Table 3 ). Higher main job wages reduce the incentive for moonlighting, by decreasing the labour supply for second jobs. Furthermore, higher levels of wealth and non-labour income (WEALTH) for all workers appear to increase the reservation wage, thereby lowering the propensity to take second jobs. Workers satisfied with their main job work hours (SATHOUR) are more likely to take second jobs. However, these do not suggest that British moonlighting is due to an hours constraint of main jobs. Male workers who are unhappy with the total pay of their main job (SATPAY) appear very keen to moonlight. The incentive for them to be multiple jobholders would appear to be due to financial pressures and the desire to raise standards of living, whilst female workers who are satisfied with the actual work of the main job (SATWORK) are more likely to undertake two jobs. Workers being satisfied or not with the job security of their main job (SATSECURITY) do not have a significant effect on moonlighting. These results provide no support for the hypothesis that job insecurity increases the probability of a worker holding a second job.
The more children a man has, the greater the probability of moonlighting, while for women having more children negatively affects taking a second job. This potentially reflects men taking more responsibility for financially supporting their children by taking a second job, while women have been discouraged from taking a second job because of the need to take care of their children either directly or indirectly through the prohibitive cost of childcare or its unavailability. Moreover, married women are less likely to moonlight, while marriage does not affected male moonlighting. For women a further apparent deterrent to moonlight is if they spend significant time travelling to work for their main job, which again could reflect their wider responsibilities. Finally, age has a significant negative effect on second job labour supply, with young workers being more likely to take second jobs, potentially through either a combination of financial necessity (repayment of student debt/loans, seeking to establish themselves in the housing market etc), or by simply possessing the necessary energy.
We also find that for workers education is associated with a higher probability of holding a second job in all categories relative to possessing no formal qualifications.
As Abdukadir (1992) points out, workers are more likely to moonlight if they have low current incomes relative to their educational attainment. Furthermore, having permanent and public-sector jobs as main jobs encourages workers to moonlight, as their main jobs may help them to find second jobs. These estimates provide no support for the hypothesis that multiple job holding may be a response to perceived job insecurity and may be a safeguard against unemployment. However, possessing a 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Conclusion
This paper examines the determinants of UK multiple job holding with data obtained from the initial eleven waves of the BHPS. Our analysis does not support the view that British moonlighting is due to main job hours constraint since workers who are satisfied with their main job work hours are more likely to take second jobs. BHPS data indicates that over 70% of male moonlighters earn more on second jobs than on main jobs, while about 65% of female moonlighters earn more on second jobs than on main jobs. Satisfaction or otherwise with job security of the main job does not have a significant effect on moonlighting per se unless they are permanent and in the publicsector. However, these estimates provide no support for the hypothesis that multiple job holding may be a response to perceived job insecurity and may be a 'hedge against unemployment'.
Over the period of our study (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) more than 88.5% of moonlighters have second jobs that are different from their main job, which supports the heterogeneous jobs hypothesis. Male workers who are unhappy with the total pay of their main job are very keen to moonlight whilst higher second job wages increase the labour supply for second jobs both for men and women. The incentive for them to moonlight therefore appears to stem from financial pressures and the desire to raise, or secure, standards of living with multiple job holding as one dimension to achieving such goals. 
APPENDIX
We undertake robustness checks with respect to the exclusion of the self-employed and the exclusion of the job satisfaction variables in the following tables. Table A1 and A2 present Random-effects Tobit estimates with and without job satisfaction variables for men and women respectively, using a sample without selfemployed people in either the main or the second job. We do not report results with wave dummies as they are very similar. Comparing the first two columns to the corresponding columns in Tables 4 and 5 (i.e. specification without wave dummies), we can see that the estimates all have the same signs and if anything, become more significant statistically. For instance, the effect of the wage in the main job remains negative but turns from being statistically insignificant for men and marginally significant for women to significant at the 1% level for both gender. On the other hand, the effect of the second-job wage remains highly significant statistically but increases in size. Moreover, removing the job satisfaction variables appear to make virtually no difference to the estimates, with perhaps the exception of the main job wage for men, where it increases slightly in size. Table A3 and A4 focus on the robustness of our main findings in Tables 4 and 5 with respect to the exclusion of the self-reported job satisfaction variables. It turns out that the two sets of estimates are remarkably similar. The only difference worth mentioning is the effect of the wage for the main job, which not only increases in size, but also become much more significant statistically, after we exclude the job satisfaction scores. This is not surprising, given that the job satisfaction variables are likely to partially capture the impact of various domains of the main job, including the satisfaction with pay.
Taken together, our sensitivity analyses suggest that our main findings are reasonably robust with respect to the exclusion of self-employed and the exclusion of the selfreported job satisfaction scores. Blau (1987 ), de Wit (1993 and Clark et al. (1993) , Cueto and Mato (2006) . However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has ever attempted to model self-employment and multiple-job-holding jointly, due to problems with measurement and identification. We argue that a full-treatment of selfemployment is beyond the scope of this paper, but will show evidence in the Appendix that our main findings remain robust with respect to the exclusion of all self-employed (in either the main or the second-job). 3 Results of these estimations are available from the first author upon request. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
